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Introduction
This paper focuses on the relationship between subsidies for nonprice export promotion and private 
sector investment in promotion. Specifically, we address whether federal subsidies for nonprice 
export promotion have any detectable effects on the total investment in promotion and on budget 
allocations. The allocation issue is particularly germane because federal outlays to support 
agricultural industries in their nonprice export promotion endeavors increased from S34 million in 
1985 to $232 million in 1992 (Kinnucan and Ackerman, p. 123). One possible outcome o f the 
increased subsidies is that industry dollars are merely diverted from domestic market promotion to
1 Kinnucan is professor and Xiao is graduate research assistant in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural 
Sociology, Auburn University. Funds supporting this research were provided by a research grant from the National 
Institute for Commodity Promotion Research and Evaluation and by Hatch Project 01 -006 “Economics of Commodity 
Promotion.” Appreciation is expressed to Wendell Dennis, Earnest Carter, Stacey Peckins, and Denise Fetters of the 
Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA, for providing data and background information on the FMD, EIP, and MPP 
programs. John E. Lenz assisted with various phases of the research and Robert G. Nelson commented on an earlier 
draft. Responsibility for final content, however, rests with the authors.
2export market promotion with no enlargement in total spending, in which case a negative spillover 
occurs in the domestic promotion program. The nexus between subsidies for export promotion and 
domestic market promotion has heretofore gone unrecognized in the literature.
Knowledge of the relationship between promotion subsidies and promotion expenditures is 
important because nonprice promotion is one of the few policy instruments available to government 
to influence agricultural exports. Traditional instruments such as export price subsidies and credit 
guarantees are no longer permissible under recent trade agreements (GATT and NAFTA). Increased 
reliance on export markets signalled by new farm legislation (Gardner), coupled with the “green 
box” designation of nonprice export promotion activities (McCleod), suggests that foreign market 
development may play a larger role in future formulations of agricultural policy.
We begin by developing a theory of nonprice export promotion for a competitive industry 
that has no control over price or quantity, has a checkoff program that permits it to promote, and 
receives a subsidy for export promotion. The analysis builds on Nerlove and Waugh’s theory of 
cooperative advertising by extending their model to include an export market. It differs from Ding 
and Kinnucan’s model of export promotion in that emphasis is placed on the promotion subsidy, 
rather than on farm programs per se. as a determinant of promotion behavior. Hypotheses generated 
from the model are tested utilizing data for 50 agricultural industries that had a checkoff program 
in 1989, a year in which funding of USDA’s export subsidy programs was at a near peak. The 
empirical analysis suggests that USDA’s subsidy programs have had a stimulative effect on 
promotion expenditures, but that most of the effect is felt in the domestic rather than export market.
Theory and Hypotheses
Consider a competitive industry that produces an exportable homogenous product and receives a
3subsidy o f t dollars per dollar of its own funds invested in export promotion. Assume that the 
industry has a checkoff program that generates an annual promotion budget equal to A" dollars. 
The industry’s problem is to allocate A" between the export and the domestic market in such a way 
that producer surplus is maximized, taking into account the subsidy for export promotion. 
Specifically, the industry’s problem is to maximize the following Lagrange function L with respect 
to Ax, Ad, and k :
(1) L = PdQx CPd, Ax( 1+t)) + Pd QJtPj, Ad) - J0<* S-'(t) d t + k(A" - Ax - Ad)
where Ax is total industry expenditures on export promotion (exclusive of the subsidy); Ad is total 
industry expenditures on domestic promotion; Pd is the price received by domestic producers, which 
is assumed to equal the world price (the law-of-one-price holds); Qx is the quantity exported; Qd is 
the quantity consumed domestically; Qs (= Qx + Q )  is domestic production; S'1 is the industry supply 
function written in inverse form, i.e., price as a function of quantity; and k  is the Lagrange 
m ultiplier. ■
The first order conditions pertaining to (1) a re :
8L/8AX = Qx 8Pd /8AX - k  = 0 
8L/8Ad = Qs 8Pd/8Aj- k  = 0  
8U8k = A °-A x -A d= 0,
which, when converted to elasticities and solved for Ax, Ad and k , yield the following optimality
conditions (see appendix):
4(2) Ax* = A"Kx Bx l[KxBx + { 1+  t)"' Kj Bj ]
(3) a ;  = A"KdBd/[(  1 + t) Kx Bx + Kd Bd ]
(4) X* = Pd Qs (Kd Bd + Kx Bx (1 + t)) / (A" D)
where D -  (Ed + KdNd + Kx Nx) > 0; Ed is the supply elasticity; Nx and Nd are demand elasticities for 
the product in the export and domestic markets, respectively, expressed in absolute value form; Kd 
is the proportion of domestic production consumed at home; Kx (= 1 - % ) is the proportion of 
domestic production exported; Bx is the percent change in exports per 1 percent change in export 
promotion expenditures, i.e., the export promotion or “advertising” elasticity; and Bd is the 
advertising elasticity for domestic promotion.
Several hypotheses are immediately apparent from (2) - (4). First, supply and demand 
elasticities, which are important in determining the marginal profitability of the overall promotion 
program, have no bearing on allocations decisions (compare equations (2) and (3) with (4)). Second, 
the subsidy for export promotion has two effects: it encourages industry to divert funds away from
domestic market promotion to export promotion (compare equations (2) and (3)); and it provides an 
incentive for industry to invest more in toto in promotion (notice the subsidy parameter in the 
numerator of (4)).
Additional insight into the relationship between subsidy and the budget can be obtained by 
solving (4) for A0 in terms of t, which yields:
(4’) A" = Pd Qs (Kd Bd + Kx Bx (1 + x))/ (X* D)
Interpreting A" as the outcome of a first stage decision problem, it is immediately apparent from (4') 
that industry will be induced to a higher level o f promotion, ceteris paribus, as the subsidy for export
5promotion becomes more generous. If the first stage decision problem is solved optimally, i.e., in 
a manner that maximizes producer surplus, then A" = A \  and. as shown by Nerlove and Waugh (p. 
822), k* = 1 + p, where p is the opportunity cost of advertising funds.
Note that the optimal advertising budget A* is based on a purely economic theory of 
cooperative advertising, and for this reason represents a theoretical upper bound. In reality, 
cooperative advertising programs must take into account political factors, such as the lobbying 
efforts of individuals or groups who may be opposed to the advertising scheme. In addition, as 
emphasized by Nerlove and Waugh (p. 820), assessment rates must be kept low enough so that the 
program can be approved by the majority of producers. For protected industries (e.g., dairy and 
cotton), advertising-induced shifts in demand may have little effect on price at the farm level, in 
which case the incentive to promote may be weakened (Kinnucan, Duffy, and Ding). If programs 
are voluntary, free-riders further diminish the ability to fund the program at the theoretical optimum. 
Thus, in general k* > 1 + p and A" < A*.
Returning to the allocation problem, an essential aspect of the foregoing theory for the 
purposes of this analysis is that subsidy indirectly affects allocations through its effect on budget 
size. To examine the indirect effect in more detail, substitute (4') into (2) and (3) and write the 
resulting equations in implicit form:
a:  = aaa\ a„ z^ aCi,z2)
A ; = Ad{A\ZihZi),Ao,Z2)
where Aa is the subsidy for export promotion in dollar terms, i.e., 4; = T is a vector of
variables governing the investment decision, i.e., Z, = {PdQs, Elh Nlh Nx, p, Bd, Bx, Kx, PE); Z2 is a
6vector of variables affecting the allocation decision, i.e., Z 2 = (Bd, Bx, K,); and PE  is a vector of 
“political economy” variables that determines the extent to which A" deviates from A*. Taking the 
total differential o f these expressions with respect to Aa yields:
(5) dAx'/dA(; = (dAx,/dA'l)(dA"/dA(;) + dA//dAa
(+) (+) (+) (+)
(6) dA//dAG = (dA;idA")(dA"ldA(i) + dAjldAG
(?) (+) (+) (-)
where the subsidy’s indirect effects on budget allocations are represented by the compound terms 
(dA t VdA ")(dA "/dA G) and 0 4 /  Id A’ )(dA‘ Id.A, )■ These indirect effects are important because they 
condition the signs and magnitudes of the total effects. In particular, in the case of export allocation 
(equation (5)), the indirect effect has the same sign as the direct effect (dA//dAG), and thus the two 
effects are mutually reinforcing.
For the domestic allocation (equation (6)), the indirect effect works in opposition to the direct 
effect, and thus the total effect is a priori indeterminate. Thus, the spillover effect of the subsidy 
onto domestic market promotion is an empirical issue. For there to be a positive spillover, the 
derivative dA"/dAa, which measures the subsidy’s “budget-expansion effect,” must be positive. 
Thus, a key issue to be addressed in this study is whether USDA’s subsidy programs induce industry 
to invest more in toto in promotion.
USDA’s Subsidy Programs
To test the foregoing hypothesis, it is necessary first to have an understanding of how the subsidy 
programs work. The USDA operates three programs germane to this analysis: the Foreign Market
7Development (FMD) program, the Export Incentive Program (EIP), and the Market Promotion 
Program (MPP), recently renamed the Market Access Program (MAP). The FMD program, which 
was established in 1954 as part of PL480, is aimed chiefly at bulk commodities (e.g., cotton, 
feedgrains, wheat), emphasizes long-term market development, and is almost exclusively generic. 
The EIP was established in 1971 specifically to support the promotion of branded agricultural 
products (e.g., Dole, Sunkist, Blue Diamond). EIP funds are directed toward consumer-ready high- 
value products (e.g., raisins, almonds, walnuts). EIP’s emphasis is on short-term sales gains through 
consumer promotions.
MPP, by far the largest of the three, was established in 1985 as the Targeted Export 
Assistance (TEA) program to “...aid U.S. producers disadvantaged by foreign trade policies" (Spatz, 
p.3). Regulations governing MPP were subsequently modified to expand participation by small 
firms and to emphasize market access over retribution for unfair trade practices (Ackerman and 
Kinnucan, p.122). The MPP is in essence a hybrid of FMD and EIP, providing funds for both 
generic and brand promotions, and for bulk as well as high-value (consumer-ready) products. Total 
authorized funding for the three programs peaked in 1992 at $233.6 million, with the bulk of the 
funds ($200 million) dispersed through MPP and EIP (Kinnucan and Ackerman, p. 123).
To participate in the programs, an industry association submits a marketing plan to USDA’s 
Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). The marketing plan must indicate objectives, target markets, 
promotion strategy, and budget. The budget indicates the total expected cost of the proposed 
promotion activity, and how that cost is to be shared among the domestic industry, the U.S. 
government, and foreign third-party cooperators, such as foreign firms or governments that agree 
to participate in the promotion effort on a cost-share basis.
8Depending on the private sector resource commitment and FAS’s assessment of the 
marketing plan, subsidies are awarded according to program regulations. Nonbrand MPP 
participants, for example, are eligible to receive up to $9 for each industry dollar invested; brand 
MPP participants, in contrast, generally receive at most $1 per industry dollar (Kinnucan and 
Ackerman, p. 122). In 1989, the ratio o f government dollars to industry dollars averaged 2.5:1 and 
the ratio o f government dollars to foreign third-party dollars averaged 1.38:1 for the 50 industries 
considered in this study (Table 1).
Model
To test whether the subsidies provided through USDA’s programs had any detectable effect on total 
promotion expenditures, and to determine how the subsidies affect allocation decisions, we 
estimated a four-equation recursive model as follows:
Budget Equation:
(7) 1il4,= a 0 + a, AGL', + a 2 \nFV,: + a 3 PRN,■+ a4 \nETA, + a 5 XSHR,■ + 
a 6 TRDSHR, + a v MAND, + a 8 PS, + e,
Cooperator Equation:
(8) ATP, = p0 + p, XVAT, + p2 XVAT} + p3 XSHR, + p4 TRDSHR, + p5 FMD, +
VeEIPi+H
Subsidy Equation:
(9) AG, = Yo + Y, ATP,+ y 2 ATP} + y3 XVAL,+ y4XVAL?+ y 5 XSHR,+
Y b TRDSHR, + y 7 l n NF,+ u ,
9Allocation Equation:
(10) AX ,=  60 + 6, ATP, + 62ATP2 + 63AG,+ 54AG,2+ 65A, + 66A,2 +
57 InETA, + 68 XSHR, + 69 TRDSHR, +
where /  indexes the industry ( / = 1,2,...,50); a, p, y, and 6 are vectors o f parameters to be 
estimated; e„ p;, Uj and are random disturbance terms; A„ ATPn AG, and AX, are the endogenous 
variables in the system; and the remaining variables are exogenous (see Table 1 for definitions).
The foregoing system assumes that export expenditures are the product o f a four-stage 
(sequential) process. In the first stage (equation (7)), the industry determines its total promotion
budget A, based on the theoretical factors defined in the Z, vector given earlier and the anticipated 
export promotion subsidy AG-'. The anticipated subsidy, in turn, is assumed to be a least-squares 
projection o f past subsidies as follows;
(7a) AG,e = a„ + at AG88, + u2 AG87; + a} AG86, + u,
where AGL‘, is the predicted subsidy for 1989 from a Tobit estimator of (7a) when the residual u, is 
zero (see Table 1 for variable definitions).
In the second stage (•equation (8)), the industry seeks funding from foreign third-party 
cooperators. Cooperator funding is assumed to be a nonlinear function of the commodity’s export 
value, and a linear function of the export share, the trade share, and past program participation, i.e., 
whether the cooperator has participated in the MPP, EIP, or FMD.
Once cooperator funding is determined, the industry applies for the subsidy (equation (9)). 
The subsidy is assumed to be a linear function of export share and trade share, and a nonlinear 
function of cooperator funding, export value, and the number of producers represented by the
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industry. The number of producers is included to control for any preferences that might be given 
to smaller industries in the allocation o f subsidy dollars.
The final stage (equation (10)) involves allocating the budget determined in the first stage 
to export promotion, taking into account the cooperator funds and subsidy secured in the 
intermediate stages. The export allocation decision is determined by the variables in the Z 2 vector 
defined earlier, with the domestic demand elasticity and the trade share serving as proxies for 
advertising elasticities. Theil posits that advertising elasticities are proportional to demand 
elasticities (see also Wohlgenant, pp. 647-48); hence the justification for using the domestic demand 
elasticity to proxy the domestic promotion elasticity. Export demand elasticities become less elastic 
as trade share increases; thus the use o f the trade share as a proxy for the export promotion 
elasticity.2
Data and Estimation Procedures
The data used to estimate (7) - (10) are based on 50 agricultural industries that had commodity 
promotion programs in 1989 as identified by Forker and Ward (pp. 102 - 103).3 These industries 
received approximately $150 million in FMD, EIP and MPP funds in 1989, which equals 65 percent 
of the appropriated funds ($230 million) for that year and 87 percent of actual expenditures ($172 
million). The data on promotion budgets (A,) are for the most recent fiscal year prior to January
2 The formula for the excess demand elasticity is (McCloskey, p. 144): Nx = (QD / Qx) N + (Qs / Qx) Erow where QD is 
the total quantity demanded in the export market; N is the market demand elasticity (in absolute value) from all sources 
(United States, its competitors, and local production); Qs is the quantity supplied to the export market by countries other 
than the United States; and Erow is the supply elasticity for “rest of world” supply. Since TRDSHR = QD/Q by 
definition, it is obvious from this formula that Nx decreases as TRDSHR increases.
3 Forker and Ward’s list actually includes 55 industries. Our sample excludes the following: canned and processed 
foods, seafood, chocolate, leather, wood, and ginseng.
1990 as reported in Forker and Ward’s Table 5-1 (pp. 102-03).
Data on subsidies (AG,), third-party expenditures (A TP), and industry expenditures for export 
promotion (AX,) were obtained from internal USDA records made available to us by Wendell Dennis 
and Denise Fetters of the FAS. These data were used to define the dummy variables for FMD and 
EIP participation (FMD, and EIP). Data on mandatory programs (MAND) were obtained from Neff 
and Plato in addition to the authors’ personal knowledge of the industries. The price-support 
variable (PS) was defined according to whether support was effective during the sample period (e.g., 
soybeans are considered unsupported because the target price during 1987-89 was below the market 
price).
Data on domestic demand elasticities (ETA) were obtained from George and King (pp. 46­
52). In instances where an elasticity estimate was not available, a value of 0.50 was used, which is 
approximately the average elasticity value estimated for the 49 commodities covered by George and 
King’s study.
Data on export share (XSHR), trade share (TRDSHR), farm value (FV), and farm numbers 
(NF), which are averages for 1987-89, were obtained from a variety of government and industry 
sources, including FAS statistical databases made available to us by Earnest Carter of the FAS. (A 
data appendix, with sources, is available upon request from the authors.) Mean values and ranges 
are given in Table 1.
Forty percent of the industries in our sample did not receive subsidies in 1989 and thus are 
presumed not to have engaged in export promotion.4 To account for the censored nature o f the
4 Although industry may invest in export promotion without benefit of subsidy, we could find no evidence to indicate 
that this happens in practice. In particular, a recent survey of commodity promotion organizations indicated that among 
those industries that invested in export promotion, all had received subsidies (Lenz).
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dependent variables in (8) - (10), the models were estimated using a maximum-likelihood Tobit 
estimator. Equation (7), which is specified in double-log form to accommodate the wide variation 
in the dependent variable ($90,000 - $209 million), was estimated by Generalized Least Squares 
utilizing White’s consistent estimator (Greene, pp. 249-50) to correct for heteroskedasticity. Unless 
indicated otherwise, a ^-statistic based on a one-tail test at the 5 percent probability level is used to 
establish statistical significance.
Results
The results are satisfactory overall in that the R:s, which range from 0.51 for the cooperator equation 
to 0.81 for the subsidy equation, are high for cross-section data, and many o f the estimated 
coefficients are significant and have the right sign. Prior to examining the subsidy impacts in detail, 
we briefly review each equation.
Budget Equation
The budget equation “explains” 67 percent of the variation in commodity promotion budgets across 
the sample’s 50 industries. As expected, promotion budgets are positively related to commodity 
value and are larger under mandatory programs than voluntary programs. Perennial crops have 
larger promotion budgets, ceteris paribus, than nonperennials, a result consistent with a priori 
expectations in that supply elasticities are expected to be smaller for perennials and thus promotion 
more profitable, ceteris paribus.
Budget appears to be unrelated to the domestic demand elasticity, the export share, or 
whether the industry is protected by a price support program. The lack o f significance of the price 
support variable suggests that protection does not necessarily reduce the incentive to promote. This 
finding is important because it suggests that producers consider more than short-term gains when
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deciding on whether or not to invest in cooperative promotion endeavors. It highlights the caveat 
raised by Nerlove and Waugh that a theory of cooperative advertising based strictly on economic 
considerations may not fully explain fully promotion budgets. The estimated coefficient for trade 
share, which serves as a proxy for the export promotion elasticity, is negative as expected.
Turning to expected subsidy, AGf (the key policy variable in the budget equation), we find 
to be positive and significant, as expected.5 The estimated coefficient, 0.1162, indicates the effect 
o f a one dollar increase in the expected subsidy on the logarithm of the promotion budget. To 
convert this coefficient to natural numbers, we multiplied it by the mean value o f the promotion 
budget as indicated in Table 3, which yields a numerical value of 1.54.6 This means that a one dollar 
increase in the anticipated subsidy is associated with an increase in the total promotion budget of 
$1.54. Thus, it appears that the subsidy has a substantial budget expansion effect. Stated another 
way, the hypothesis that the subsidy merely diverts funds from domestic market promotion with no 
enlargement in industry’s total investment in promotion is rejected by these data.
Perspective on the relative magnitude of the estimated budget expansion effect can be 
obtained by recalling that in 1989, domestic industry received on average $2.50 in government funds 
per dollar of its own funds. Viewed in this way, the marginal effect of the subsidy (1.54) is less than 
the average effect (2.50), as would be expected if budgets were in the profitable range.
5 The estimated regression used to compute AG" is as follows (figures in parentheses are asymptotic /-ratios):
A G1', = -0.7074 (2.45) + 0.4286 (4.23) AG88, + 0.3094 (2.59) AG 87, +
0.7945 (5.34) AG86, + 1.3408 (7.66) o, R2 = 0.949
where a, is the variance term from the Tobit estimator and the R2 is from the OLS equation. Note that the sum of the 
lagged coefficients (1.53) indicates that a dollar increase in past subsidies is associated with an expected increase in 
current subsidy of greater than one dollar. This probably reflects the implementation of TEA in 1985 and the subsequent 
quintupling of subsidies over the next five years from $40 million to $230 million (Kinnucan and Ackerman, p. 123).
6 That this is appropriate is seen by noting that dlm4 = d HA. Thus, in equation (7), dlx^A/dAG = a,, which implies
d Aid AG' = a, A.
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Cooperator Equation
The cooperator equation “explains” 51 percent of the variation in third-party funds among the 50 
industries. Third-party hands increase at a decreasing rate with respect to export value, are positively 
related to trade share, and are unrelated to export share. FMD participants receive $4.46 million 
more in third-party funds, ceteris paribus, than MPP participants, the excluded category. This 
result, coupled with the insignificance of EIPh is consistent with the fact FMD participants receive 
a more generous subsidy, on average, than EIP or MPP participants, owing to the almost exclusively 
generic nature of FMD promotion activities. Recall that generic advertisers receive up to $9 in 
subsidy per industry dollar invested, while brand advertisers are limited, generally, to $1 per dollar 
invested. In 1990 TEA/MPP was 34 percent brand while FMD was 1 percent brand (Mackie, p. 21). 
EIP, by law, is 100 percent brand.
Subsidy Equation
The subsidy equation, with an R2 of 0.81, has the highest explanatory power of any equation in the 
system. All estimated coefficients have the expected sign and most are significant. Promotion 
subsidies are positively related to export share, trade share, export value, and foreign third-party 
funds. The quadratic term for export value is negative, indicating that subsidy increases with export 
value, but at a decreasing rate.
A similar relationship appears to exist between subsidy and third-party funds, as the linear 
term is positive and the quadratic term is negative. The marginal effect of third-party funds on 
subsidy capture, evaluated at data means (s^eJTable 3), is 0.68.7 This means that each additional
7 The marginal effects from a Tobit model (equations (8)-(10)) are computed by multiplying the model’s regression 
coefficients by the probability of a nonlimit response. The probability of a nonlimit response estimated for each 
equation is given in Table 3.
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dollar secured in third-party funds is matched, at the margin, by 68 cents in government funds, 
ceteris paribus.
The number of farmers represented by a commodity has no effect on subsidy capture, as the 
InFTV, variable is insignificant. Thus, it appears that no particular favoritism is bestowed on smaller 
industries with respect to the allocation of federal promotion subsidies.
Allocation Equation
Fifty-eight percent of the variation in export expenditures among the 50 industries can be
“explained” by the variables specified in the allocation equation. However, among the variables
specified, only subsidy is significant. One interpretation o f this result is that the theory elucidated
earlier lacks explanatory power. A more plausible explanation, however, is that the regression
suffers for the “dominate variable” problem, to wit (Rao and Miller, pp. 40-41):
In many empirical studies theory tells us unambiguously that a particular variable is relevant 
in explaining movements of the dependent variable, but it cannot be included in the 
regression equation because it is a dominant variable. Such a variable dominates all other 
variables in the regression and attempts to account for all o f the variation in the dependent 
variable, leaving nothing to be explained by other variables. This situation frequently occurs 
in empirical research where the dependent variable is somehow functionally related to an 
independent variable in “fixed proportions.”
In our application, cost-sharing formulae applicable to the subsidy programs suggest a functional 
relationship between export promotion expenditures and subsidy, implying a dominant variable 
problem. To test this, we re-labeled equation (10) Model A and estimated two alternative versions. 
One version, Model B, deletes the subsidy variables. The other version, Model C, retains only the 
subsidy variables.
Results confirm the dominant-variable hypothesis. In particular, when the subsidy variables
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are deleted from the allocation equation, the remaining variables have the correct sign and most are 
significant at the 10 percent level or lower (compare Models A and B, Table 3). Similarly, 
regressing export expenditures on subsidy exclusively results in little loss in “explanatory” power 
(compare Models A and C). Moreover, the estimated coefficients for subsidy in Models A and C 
are similar, which suggests that multicollinearity is not the cause of the “insignificant” variables in 
Model A. Based on these results, we accept the dominant-variable explanation for Model A ’s results 
and proceed by utilizing Model B when discussing nonsubsidy impacts.
Results suggest that export promotion expenditures are positively related to budget size, 
subsidy, third-party funds, the absolute value of the domestic demand elasticity (our proxy for the 
domestic promotion elasticity), and export share. However, the last two of these variables, along 
with trade share, are not significant at usual probability levels. The negative coefficients associated 
with the quadratic terms for budget, subsidy, and third-party funds suggest the monies devoted to 
export promotion increase at a decreasing rate with respect to these variables.
The marginal effects of third-party funds, subsidy, and budget on export promotion 
expenditures, evaluated at data means, are indicated in Table 3. Not surprisingly, we find that the 
marginal effect of the subsidy (0.52) is much larger than the marginal effect of either third-party 
funds (0.23) or budget (0.07). The especially small marginal effect for budget suggests that 
industry’s propensity to invest in export promotion is low, a finding that has important implications 
for the indirect effects of subsidy to be discussed presently.8
8 That industry is reluctant to invest in export promotion is hardly surprising, given the presence of close substitutes for 
U.S. agricultural commodities in international markets and the attendant free-rider problem (Goddard and Conboy).
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Policy Implications
One goal of the USDA’s subsidy programs is to expand industry investment in export promotion. 
To determine how effective the programs have been in accomplishing this objective, and to 
determine the spillover effect o f the subsidy programs on domestic market promotion, we calculated 
the total effects of the subsidy utilizing equations (5) and (6) and the appropriate numerical values 
of the partial derivatives in Table 3 as follows:
(U7(L4f; = {dAx*ldA°%dA°ldA^ + dAx*ldAa 
0.6210 = (0.0678X1.5412) + 0.5165 
dAt;/dAa = (dAd'ldA")(dA°ldAG) + dAj'/dAa 
0.9202 = (0.9322)(1.5412) - 0.5165.
According to these calculations, it appears that the subsidy programs have achieved their intended 
purpose. In particular, a dollar increase in subsidy is associated with a 62.1 cent increase in industry 
investment in export promotion when the indirect effect of the subsidy (10.5 cents) is taken into 
account. The marginal effect of a dollar increase in budget, by comparison, is a mere 6.8 cents. 
Thus, it appears that subsidies are an important factor in determining the total industry investment 
in export promotion. In other words, given industry’s apparent reluctance to commit budget at the 
margin to export promotion, it appears that very little cooperative promotional activity would occur 
in export markets without the inducements offered by the USDA’s subsidy programs.
Turning to the spillover effect, we find that the subsidy has a positive effect on domestic 
market promotion. In particular, a dollar increase in subsidy increases domestic market promotion 
an estimated 92.0 cents. That the spillover effect is positive can be traced to the subsidy’s indirect 
effect, which is relatively large owing to the positive budget-expansion effect (1.54) and a high
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propensity to allocate budget to domestic market promotion (0.93) in preference to export market 
promotion (0.07). Multiplying these factors produces an indirect effect of $1.44, which is more than 
sufficient to offset the subsidy’s direct effect of - $0.52. Thus, far from diverting funds from the 
domestic promotion program, the subsidy appears to enlarge domestic market promotion by 
encouraging industry to invest more in toto in promotion.
Concluding Comments
The theory of nonprice export promotion developed in this paper suggests that subsidies for export 
promotion provide incentives to invest more in export promotion, less in domestic promotion, and 
more in promotion in toto. The key issue, then, is: do promotion subsidies targeted at the export 
market have beneficial effects overall, or are they merely redistributive, robbing Peter to pay Paul? 
Investigating this question with respect to the federal subsidy programs aimed at the agricultural 
sector, our empirical analysis is affirmative. That is, we find that a dollar increase in the anticipated 
subsidy induces industry to expand its total promotion budget by an estimated $ 1.54, with 60 percent 
of the increment (92 cents) going to domestic market promotion and 40 percent (62 cents) going to 
export promotion.
Although our results suggest that the USDA’s subsidy programs have had a stimulative effect 
on promotion expenditures in both the domestic and the export market, we caution that this does not 
necessarily imply that the subsidy programs are beneficial from a social welfare perspective. That 
depends on whether the subsidies do indeed cause identifiable shifts in market demand or supply 
schedules, on who gets the subsidies, and on opportunity costs. Subsidies given to protected 
industries, for example, may be welfare-decreasing in that resources may be attracted away from 
more efficient, unprotected industries (DeBoer). Similarly, if the opportunity cost of funds invested
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in promotion (e.g., returns from foregone production research) is high, the subsidies may lead to a 
net reduction in producer welfare (Wohlgenant). Still, if the goal is simply to increase private sector 
investment in export promotion without doing damage to domestic market promotion, it appears that 
the subsidy programs have been highly effective.
A caveat in interpreting our results is that the estimates are based on a time period (1986-89) 
in which subsidies were expanding rapidly and many promotion programs (42 percent) were 
voluntary. This, coupled with the generosity of the subsidies, especially for generic-based 
promotions, may account for the large estimated budget-expansion effect. Since then, subsidies have 
become less generous due to funding cuts, and most promotion programs have become mandatory. 
With mandatory programs, industry has less flexibility in responding to subsidy-based incentives. 
Thus, it would be hazardous to use the total effects estimated in this study to predict the effect of 
subsidy reductions. In particular, with the current preponderance of mandatory programs, one would 
not expect budgets to decline at the same rate as they increased when subsidies were expanding and 
many more programs were voluntary. The irreversibility of promotion budgets in the mandatory era, 
however, does not subtract from the basic conclusion that export promotion subsidies appear to have 
had a significant expansionary effect on nonprice promotion activity in the agricultural sector.
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics, 50 Agricultural Commodities, United 
States, 1989
Variable Definition Mean
Value Range
Endogenous Variables
A, Total promotion budget for /th 
commodity, million dollars
13.263 0.09- 209.1
ATP, Foreign third-party funds received by 
/th commodity for export promotion, 
million dollars
2.126 0 -28.23
AG, Government funds received by /th 
commodity for export promotion, 
million dollars
2.944 0 -  19.63
AXi Domestic industry expenditures for 
export promotion by /th commodity, 
million dollars
1.177 0-7 .851
Exogenous Variables:
AG88i Gov’t funds received by /th 
commodity in 1988, million dollars
2.516 0 -  19.05
AG87, Gov’t funds received by /th 
commodity in 1987, million dollars
1.357 0 -  10.44
AG86j Gov’t funds received by /th 
commodity in 1986, million dollars
2.019 0 -1 1 .0 2
FV, Farm value of /th commodity, billion 
dollars >
2.673 .0125 - 35.76
XSHRi Export share for /th commodity, 
percent
17.475 0 -7 1 .3
XVAL, Export value for /th commodity, 
billion dollars
0.451 0 - 4.80
TRDSHR, World trade share for /th commodity, 
percent 25.512 0 -8 7 .3
ETA, Demand elasticity for /th commodity, 
absolute value
0.505 0.14- 1.56
NF, Number of farmers producing /th 71.894 0.07- 1,141
commodity, thousands
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PRN,
PS,
MAND, 
FMD,
EIP,
Zero-one variable to indicate whether 0.46
z'th commodity is a perennial
Zero-one variable to indicate whether
z'th commodity has a price support 0.18
program
Zero-one variable to indicate whether
z'th commodity’s checkoff program is 0.58
mandatory
Zero-one variable to indicate whether 0.34
the z'th commodity received funding 
from Foreign Market Development 
program
Zero-one variable to indicate whether 0.04
the z'th commodity received funding 
from Export Incentive Program
0 - 1
0 - 1
0 - 1 
0-1
0 - 1
Table 2. GLS Estimates of Budget Equation and Tobit Estimates of Cooperator, Subsidy, and Allocation 
Equations, 50 U.S. Agricultural Industries, 1989 Data
Variable/
Statistic
Budget
Equation3
Cooperator
Equation
Subsidy
Equation
Allocation Equation
Model A Model B Model C
a g ; 0.1162
(2.60)b
- - - - -
ATP, - - 1.7002
(5.78)
0.0224
(0.07)
0.6739
(2.58)
-
ATP/ - - -0.0546
(5.42)
-0.0028
(0.25)
-0.0231
(2.41)
-
AG, - -- - 1.1717
(3-31)
- 1.1013
(4.89)
AG f - - — -0.0398
(2.08)
— -0.0359
(2.57)
A, - - — 0.0470
(0.58)
0.2227
(2.50)
-
A; - - - -0.0004
(0-43)
-0.0021
(2.16)
-
InFV, 0.7237
(6.35)
— - — — -
PRN, 1.3019
(3.05)
— — -- — —
\x\ETA, -0.4338
(1.01)
- - 0.6727
(0.51)
1.9491
(1.29)
-
XSHR, -0.0010
(0.08)
-0.0767
(1.38)
0.0791
(2.51)
-0.0161
(0.58)
0.0347
(1.24)
—
TRDSHR, -0.0134
(1.89)
' 0.0650 
(1.63)
0.0459
(2.37)
-0.0219
(1.14)
-0.0010
(0.04)
-
MAND, 0.6823
(190)
— — " —
PS, 0.4175
(0.85)
- — - — -
XVAL-, - 10.813
(3.56)
3.4736
(1.57)
- — -
XVAL? " -1.9461
(2.97)
-0.9915
(2.51)
” — —
FMD, - 4.4605
(2.32)
- - - -
23
EIP,
"
2.1159
(0.48)
\nFN, - -
Constant 0.2579 -4.4467
(0.47) (2.51)
Sigma - 4.8996
(6.74)
$(B'X/s)c - 0.4653
R2i 0.677 0.514
Log-
Likelihood
-73.586 -87.831
0.3103
(0.93)
-3.8260 -0.7791 -0.9856 -1.8218
(3.44) (0.67) (0.73) (2.98)
2.6102 2.3762 2.7911 2.5049
(7.57) (7.65) (7.68) (7.73)
0.4651 0.5510 0.4059 0.5597
0.806 0.579 0.408 0.521
-80.625 -76.389 -81.347 -78.541
a Corrected for heteroskedasticity using White’s estimator. 
b Number in parenthesis is the absolute value of the asymptotic /-value. 
c Probability of a nonlimit response.
d From OLS estimate.
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Table 3. Estimated Marginal Effects of Anticipated Subsidy (AG*), Actual Subsidy (AG), 
Third-Party Funds (ATP) and Budget (A), Evaluated at Data Means
Item Formula3 Value
3.Aid.AG" a, A'" 1.5412
M G  Id ATP $(Y’X/s) (y , + 2 y2ATP"') 0.6827
dAX/dATP <J>(S’X/s) (b ,+ 2 b 2ATPm) 0.2337
dAX/dAG <S>(6’X/s) (63 + 2 64 ^G"') 0.5165
dAX/dA $ ( 6’X/s) (65 + 2 56A m) 0.0678
a A (= 13.263), ATP'" (=2.126), and AO" (=2.944) refer, respectively, to the mean value of the 
promotion budget, third-party funds, and subsidy (See Table 1). Numerical values for 63 and 
64 are from Model A of Table 2; values for the remaining 6k parameters are from Model B.
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Appendix: Derivation of Optimality Conditions
To begin, define the structural model as follows:
(A l) Qx = f(Pd,A x( l+ ^ )) (export demand)
(A2) Qd = Ad) (domestic demand)
(A3) Q, = S(Pd) (domestic supply)
(A4) Qx = Qx + Qj (market-clearing equilibrium).
where the quantity and price variables in (A l) - (A4) (defined in the text) pertain to initial 
equilibrium values. With these relationships in mind, the Lagrange function then can be written in 
simpler notation as:
(A5) L = Pd Qx + PdQd- J *  S-\t) dt + X(A‘> - Ax - Ad).
The first order conditions are:
dL/dAx = Pd (dQx /8AX) + Qx (8Pd !8AX) + Qd (8Pd !8AX) - S ' (dQx /8AX) -X = 0
dL/dAd = Pd (dQd /dAd) + Qd (dPd /dAd) + Qx (dPd !dAd) - S 1 (dQd /dAd) - X  = 0
dL/dX=A°-Ax - Ad= 0.
Noting that Pd = from (A3) and Qs = Qx + Qd from (A4), the above equations reduce to:
(A6) 8L/dAx = Q„ (dPd !dAx) - X = 0
(A7) 8L/dAd= Qs (8Pd t8Ad) - k  = 0
(A8) 8L/dX = A ° - Ax - A d= 0,
which are equivalent to the first-order conditions equations given in the text.
Next, express (A6) and (A7) in elasticity form:
(A61) 8L/8Ax = [(Q,Pd)/Ax] E ,,Ax -X  = 0
(AT) 8L/8Ad -  \(QX Pd)/Ad] E PAd-X = 0
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where E ,> Ax = (8Pd Id4 )(4 ) is the reduced-form elasticity of price with respect to export
promotion and E rAd = (8Pd ldAd )(Ad IPd ) is the reduced-form elasticity o f price with respect to 
domestic promotion.
The task now is to derive expressions for E ,>Ax and E ,,Ad in terms of the underlying structural 
elasticities. For this purpose, first express the structural model in log-differential form as follows: 
(A 1 ’) dinQx = - Nx dinPd + Bx (1 + x) dlnZ,
(A2') din Qd = - Nd dinPd + Bd dimi d
(A31) d ing , = Ed dlmPd
(A4-) d ing , = Kd d in e , + Kx dinQx
where dlnZ = dZ/Z is the relative change in variable Z and the coefficients of dlnZ terms are as 
defined in the text.
Setting &\nAd = 0 and substituting (AF) - (A31) into (A4') and solving for dimPd gives the 
reduced-form elasticity for price with respect to export promotion:
(A9) dlmP^/dlnZ, |dlnAd = 0 = 'E,.Ax = Kx Bx ( 1 + x) ID
where D = (Ed+ Kd Nd + Kx Nx).
The corresponding reduced-form elasticity for domestic promotion is obtained in a similar 
fashion by setting dlnZ, = 0:
(A10) d ln /y d ln Z , |dlnAx. 0 = E PAd = KdBd/D.
Substituting (A9) and (A10) into (A61) and (A7') and re-writing the resulting expressions in terms 
o f Ax and Ad yields:
(A l l )  Ax = Pd QxKxBx ( \ + x ) l { D X )
(A 12) A d =  P d Qs K d B d / (D  X).
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Substituting (A l l )  and (A12) into (A8) yields the expression for the Lagrange multiplier in 
equilibrium:
(A 13) r  = Pd a  (Kd Bd + KXBX(\ + T)) / (A0 D),
which is identical to text equation (4). Text equations (2) and (3) are obtained by back substitution 
of(A13) into (A l l )  and (A12). QED
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